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In 2013, President Xi Jinping launched his signature foreign policy, the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), to foster international connectivity and cooperation through infrastructure investments. Many 
question the BRI’s real meaning, scope and global effects. Some lament its unclear nature, for there 
is still no authoritative list of BRI investment projects and no clear regulatory framework for FDI in 
this area. Other have considered the Initiative as destabilizing for the international liberal order and 
good governance standards and fear China’s weaponizing investment is challenging the currently 
open but mostly fragmented FDI regime.  
 
Has the BRI created a new regulatory framework for China’s outward FDI? What are its 
characteristics, and is it challenging the current international economic order? To ascertain whether 
critics of the BRI are correct, one must look at China’s BRI policy papers, outward FDI guidelines, 
recent bilateral investment treaties (BITs), free trade agreements (FTAs), and practice. 
 
The official five objectives of the BRI are: enhancing policy coordination; improving infrastructure 
connectivity through six international corridors; reinforcing trade and investment cooperation, 
especially in the industrial sector; moving forward with financial integration; and supporting people-
to-people collaboration. Following China’s “Going out Policy” and the BRI, the country’s outward 
FDI surpassed FDI inflows for the first time in 2015, reaching its peak in 2016. Although an 
overarching law governing overseas commercial and assistance activity is lacking, the government 
has issued hundreds of directives and regulations since 2013 regulating outward FDI to fit Chinese 
development and industrial policies and encouraging China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
private companies to respect local customs, honor social responsibilities and uphold environmental 
and labor protections. The Guidelines for Enterprise Compliance Management of Overseas 
Operations (2018), for example, encourage Chinese investors abroad (including BRI investors) to 
comply with domestic rules and self-disciplinary regulations, Chinese and host country laws and 
international treaties. The China State Council’s Opinions on Further Guiding and Regulating 
Outbound Investment (2017) delineates how outbound investment should align with the BRI. From 
the perspective of China’s inward and outward investment regimes, the classification of projects into 
“encouraged,” “restricted” and “prohibited” categories provides some coherence to China’s policies 
toward FDI in the BRI area.1 Both documents do not contradict the essence and use a similar language 
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of the OECD’s Policy Framework for Investment and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises. 
 
If Chinese regulations and guidelines on outward FDI are increasingly in line with international 
standards and best practices, one major issue is the Chinese central government’s lack of control over 
its economic actors abroad and the voluntary nature of most of the guidelines.2 Chinese SOEs and 
policy banks at the forefront of the BRI appear to be more aware of, and adaptive to, host country 
regulations and laws than the guidelines of their home country government.3 Moreover, given the 
structural differences of BRI countries, Chinese outward FDI has different objectives. The legal 
framework varies from memoranda of understanding and partnerships with BRI countries in support 
of the Initiative to legally binding BITs and FTAs. China’s BITs with the global north increasingly 
include more comprehensive investor-state dispute-settlement provisions, national treatment and 
more expansive sets of disciplines; meanwhile, most BITs with the global south have not changed 
since the 1990s, and their supplementation with BRI memoranda of understanding and partnerships 
might suggest a government-led interventionist approach to investment protection in some sectors.4 
 
The BRI may be unclear, and China—like most other countries—does not have detailed regulations 
for outbound investment. However, the Initiative is already impacting FDI regulations, rerouting 
economic and shifting funds between sectors and countries and filling the imaginary of development 
with new ideas that prioritize development rights and infrastructure. While it is likely that China will 
increasingly use several legal instruments to protect its investment abroad and does not seem to 
challenge the international economic order, a homogenous regulatory pattern for BRI investment is 
unlikely. China is pragmatic and adaptive in dealing with BRI host countries’ disparate interests and 
legal systems. Given its “sovereignty first” policy, China has so far abstained from seeking to 
transform the legal and governance system of host countries. In this sense, host countries have an 
opportunity to shape the Initiative. Those with weak legal institutions or lacking experience in certain 
BRI sectors, such as infrastructure, should share their knowledge through the creation of common 
platforms or rely on initiatives such as the Blue Dot Network. 
 
* The Columbia FDI Perspectives are a forum for public debate. The views expressed by the author(s) do not reflect 
the opinions of CCSI or Columbia University or our partners and supporters. Columbia FDI Perspectives (ISSN 
2158-3579) is a peer-reviewed series. 
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For further information, including information regarding submission to the Perspectives, please contact: Columbia Center 
on Sustainable Investment, Riccardo Loschi, riccardo.loschi@columbia.edu.  
 
The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), a joint center of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute 
at Columbia University, is a leading applied research center and forum dedicated to the study, practice and discussion of 
sustainable international investment. Our mission is to develop and disseminate practical approaches and solutions, as 
well as to analyze topical policy-oriented issues, in order to maximize the impact of international investment for 
sustainable development. The Center undertakes its mission through interdisciplinary research, advisory projects, multi-
stakeholder dialogue, educational programs, and the development of resources and tools. For more information, visit us 
at http://www.ccsi.columbia.edu. 
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